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ABSTRACT
In contrast to today’s IP-based host-oriented Internet ar-
chitecture, Information-Centric Networking (ICN) empha-
sizes content by making it directly addressable and routable.
Named Data Networking (NDN) architecture is an instance
of ICN that is being developed as a candidate next-generation
Internet architecture. By opportunistically caching content
within the network (in routers), NDN appears to be well-
suited for large-scale content distribution and for meeting
the needs of increasingly mobile and bandwidth-hungry ap-
plications that dominate today’s Internet.
One key feature of NDN is the requirement for each con-
tent object to be digitally signed by its producer. Thus,
NDN should be, in principle, immune to distributing fake
(aka “poisoned”) content. However, in practice, this poses
two challenges for detecting fake content in NDN routers:
(1) overhead due to signature verification and certificate
chain traversal, and (2) lack of trust context, i.e., determin-
ing which public keys are trusted to verify which content.
Because of these issues, NDN does not force routers to verify
content signatures, which makes the architecture susceptible
to content poisoning attacks.
This paper explores root causes of, and some cures for,
content poisoning attacks in NDN. In the process, it be-
comes apparent that meaningful mitigation of content poi-
soning is contingent upon a network-layer trust management
architecture, elements of which we construct while carefully
justifying specific design choices. This work represents the
initial effort towards comprehensive trust management for
NDN.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet usage model has changed considerably over
the last two decades. Limitations of the current Internet
are becoming more pronounced as network services and ap-
plications become increasingly mobile and data-centric. In
recent years, a number of research efforts have sprung up
aiming to design the next-generation Internet architecture.
Some are based on the notion of Information-Centric Net-
working (ICN) which emphasizes efficient and scalable con-
tent distribution. Named Data Networking (NDN)[28], a
fork from PARC’s Content Centric Networking (CCNx) ar-
chitecture[6], is one such research effort. One of the main
tenets of NDN is named content. NDN also stipulates in-
network content caching, by routers. To secure each con-
tent, NDN requires it to be cryptographically signed by its
producer. This way, globally addressable and routable con-
tent can be authenticated by anyone, which allows NDN to
decouple trust in content from trust in entities that store
and disseminate it. NDN entities that request content are
called consumers. A consumer is expected to verify content
signatures in order to assert:
• Integrity – a valid signature (computed over a content
hash) guarantees that signed content is intact;
• Origin Authentication – since a signature is bound to
the public key of the signer, anyone can verify whether
content originates with its claimed producer;
• Correctness – since a signature binds content name to
its payload, a consumer can securely determine whether
delivered content corresponds to what was requested;
Although any NDN entity can verify any content signature,
NDN routers are not required, to do so. This is not only
because of the overhead stemming from the actual crypto-
graphic verification of the signature itself. There are two
other, more important, reasons for not mandating router
verification of content signatures:
1. First, a router must be aware of the specific trust
model for each content-producing application. Given
the wide range of possible applications, it is very un-
likely that they will all use the same trust model. Some
applications will probably use trust hierarchies, while
others might adopt a flat peer-based trust models, or
hybrid versions thereof. Furthermore, the set of NDN
applications will change over time. Also, the trust
model of a particular application might not be static
in the long term.
2. Second, depending on the trust model of an application
associated with a particular content, a router needs
access to – and thus might need to fetch1 – multiple
public key certificates or similar structures in order to
trust the public key that verifies a content signature.
For example, if an application uses a hierarchical PKI,
an entire root-to-leaf path might have to be traversed
and all intermediate certificates would need to be sep-
arately verified. This would need to include ancillary
activities for each such certificate, i.e., expiration and
revocation checking.
These issues greatly complicate network-layer trust manage-
ment in NDN. One easy alternative – adopted by the current
version of NDN – is to make it optional for routers to verify
content signatures. Unfortunately, this decision leaves NDN
vulnerable to content poisoning attacks on router caches.
To make matters worse, NDN does not provide any defini-
tive mechanism for a consumer to request genuine desired
1The alternative of carrying the entire collection of certifi-
cates as part of each content is clearly undesirable.
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content. Instead, a consumer that receives fake content can
explicitly exclude the latter (by referring to its hash) in sub-
sequent requests. This does not guarantee eventual success,
due to the potentially unbounded number of fake content
objects sharing the same name.
This undesirable state-of-affairs serves as the main moti-
vation for our work. In this paper, we analyze NDN archi-
tecture and its susceptibility to content poisoning attacks.
Next, we postulate some intuitive goals for routers to sup-
port trust management and content validation. We then
present simple rules that allow NDN parties (consumers,
producers and routers) to mitigate content poisoning, while
minimizing trust-related complexity for routers. These rules
require no changes to the fundamentals of the NDN archi-
tecture.
Besides being the first effort to address content poison-
ing and trust management in NDN, one contribution of this
work is in careful analysis and justifications for placement
and complexity of various trust mechanisms.
Disclaimer: it is impossible to predict whether NDN will
ever cross the line between a research prototype and a widely
deployed architecture. NDN, similar to every other candi-
date Future Internet Architecture, has its benefits and pit-
falls. The purpose of this work is not to advocate for or
against NDN. Instead, we aim to improve NDN security
features by utilizing techniques in [32, 17, 18, 13, 23]. Our
main goal is to provide NDN routers with a mechanism to
efficiently and securely verify content in order to mitigate
content poisoning attacks.
Scope: as reflected in the title, this paper focuses on network-
layer trust issues, motivated by the content poisoning prob-
lem. We do not address other NDN security issues, such as
interest flooding attacks [8, 15, 2], cache pollution attacks
[10] and routing security [34].
2. NDN OVERVIEW
Unlike IP which focuses on end-points of communication
and their names/addresses, NDN ([21, 28]) emphasizes con-
tent and makes it named, addressable and routable at the
network layer. A content name is composed of one or more
variable-length components opaque to the network. Com-
ponent boundaries are explicitly delimited by “/” in the
usual path-like representation. For example, the name of
CNN home-page content for August 20, 2014 might be:
/ndn/cnn/news/2014august20/index.htm. Large content
can be split into segments with different names, e.g., frag-
ment 37 of Alice’s YouTube video could be named:
/ndn/youtube/alice/video-749.avi/37.
NDN communication adheres to the pull model and con-
tent is delivered to consumers only following an explicit re-
quest. There are two types of packets in NDN: interest
and content. A consumer requests content by issuing an
interest packet. If an entity can “satisfy” a given interest,
it returns a corresponding content packet. Content deliv-
ery must be preceded by an interest. If content C with
name n is received by a router with no pending interest
for n, C is considered unsolicited and is discarded. Name
matching in NDN is prefix-based. For example, an interest
for /ndn/youtube/alice/video-749.avi can be satisfied by
content named /ndn/youtube/alice/video-749.avi/37.2
NDN content includes several fields. In this paper, we are
2The reverse does not hold, by design.
only interested in the following:
• Signature – a public key signature, generated by the
content producer, covering the entire content, includ-
ing all explicit components of the name and a reference
to the public key needed to verify it.
• Name – a sequence of explicit name components fol-
lowed by an implicit digest (cryptographic hash) com-
ponent of the content that is recomputed at every hop.
This effectively provides each content with a unique
name and guarantees a match with a name provided in
an interest. However, in most cases, the digest com-
ponent is not present in interest packets, since NDN
does not provide any secure mechanism for a consumer
to learn a content hash, prior to requesting it.
• PublisherPublicKeyDigest (PPKD) – an SHA-256
digest of the public key needed to verify the content
signature.
• Type – content type, e.g., data, encrypted content, key,
etc.
• Freshness – recommended content lifetime (after be-
ing cached) set by the producer.
• KeyLocator – a reference to the public key required
to verify the signature. This field has three options:
(1) verification key, (2) certificate containing the veri-
fication key, or (3) NDN name referencing the content
that contains the verification key.
Each content producer must have at least one public key,
represented as a bona fide named content of Type= key,
signed by its issuer, e.g., a certification authority (CA).3
The naming convention for a public key content object is
to contain “key” as its last explicit component, e.g., /ndn/
russia/moscow-airport/transit/snowden/key.
An NDN interest includes the following fields:
• Name – NDN name of requested content.
• Exclude – contains information about name compo-
nents that must not occur in the name of returned
content. This field can also be used to exclude certain
content by referring to its digest, which, as noted
above, is included in the content as an implicit last
component of each content name, or in a separate field.
• PublisherPublicKeyDigest (PPKD) – the SHA-256 di-
gest of the publisher public key. If this field is present
in the interest, a matching content objects must have
the same digest in its PPKD.
There are three types of NDN entities4: (1) consumer – an
entity that issues an interest for content, (2) producer – an
entity that produces and publishes (as well as signs) content,
and (3) router – an entity that routes interest packets and
forwards corresponding content packets. Each entity (not
just routers) maintains the following three components:
• Content Store (CS) – cache used for content caching
and retrieval. From here on, we use the terms CS and
cache interchangeably.
• Forwarding Interest Base (FIB) – routing table of name
prefixes and corresponding outgoing interfaces used to
route interests. NDN does not specify or mandate any
routing protocol. Forwarding is done via longest-prefix
match on names.
3Recall that NDN is agnostic as far as trust management,
aiming to accommodate peer-based, hierarchical and hybrid
PKI approaches.
4Note that a physical entity (a host, in today’s parlance)
can be both consumer and producer of content.
• Pending Interest Table (PIT) – table of outstanding
(pending) interests and a set of corresponding incom-
ing and outgoing interfaces.
When a router receives an interest for content named n
which is not in its cache, and there are no pending inter-
ests for the same name in its PIT, it forwards the inter-
est to the next hop(s), according to its FIB. For each for-
warded interest, a router stores some amount of state infor-
mation, including the name in the interest and the interface
on which it arrived. However, if an interest for n arrives
while there is a pending entry for the same content name in
the PIT, the router collapses the present interest (and any
subsequent interests for n) storing only the interface upon
which it was received. If and when content is returned, the
router forwards it out on all incoming-interest interfaces and
flushes the corresponding PIT entry. Since no additional in-
formation is needed to deliver content, an interest does not
carry any source address. (If a content fails to arrive before
some router-determined expiration time, the router can ei-
ther flush the PIT entry or attempt interest retransmission
over the same or different interfaces.)
An NDN router’s cache size is determined by local re-
source availability. Each router unilaterally determines which
content to cache and for how long, though lifetime (as men-
tioned above) can be recommended by the producer. Upon
receiving an interest, a router first checks its cache to see
if it already has requested content in its cache. Producer-
originated content signatures allow consumers and routers to
authenticate received content, regardless of the entity serv-
ing it.
3. CONTENT POISONING
The central objective of NDN is efficient and scalable dis-
tribution of information. This is facilitated by routers op-
portunistically caching content. Whenever an NDN router
receives an interest for a name that matches a content in
its cache, it satisfies the interest with that content. Since
routers are not required to verify signatures, the delivered
content is not guaranteed to be authentic. However, a con-
sumer is required to verify signatures of all returned con-
tent. A consumer is thus assumed to have the necessary
application-specific trust context to decide which public keys
to trust. This allows consumers to reliably detect fake con-
tent.
However, NDN offers no means for consumers to ask routers
to flush fake content from their caches. The only recourse
for a consumer that detects fake content is to issue another
interest that specifically excludes the unwanted content by
specifying its hash in the exclusion filter field of the new in-
terest. Unfortunately, this explicit exclusion does not signify
(to routers) bad or poisoned content, as the same feature can
also be used to exclude stale content. Furthermore, even if
the exclusion technique were to be used strictly for flagging
poisoned content, the result would be undesirable, for the
following reasons:
The entire notion of consumers (i.e, end-systems or hosts)
informing routers about poisoned content is full of pitfalls.
Suppose a consumer complains to a router about specific
content. If this is done without consumer authentication
(whether via an interest, e.g, using exclusion, or via a sep-
arate packet type), the router would have two choices: (1)
immediately flush referenced content from its cache, or (2)
verify the content signature and flush content only if veri-
fication fails. The former (1) is problematic, since it opens
the door for anyone to cause easy removal of popular content
from router caches, which can be considered as a type of a
denial-of-service attack. Even if this were not an issue, there
would remain a more general problem: as noted in [15], the
adversary mounting a content poisoning attack could con-
tinue ad infinitum to feed new invalid content in response to
interests that exclude previously consumer-detected invalid
content. The second option (2) is also problematic, because,
besides the cost of verifying a signature (which can lead to a
denial-of-service attack by itself), it brings back the problem
of routers having to understand potentially complex trust
semantics of many diverse content-producing applications.
Another possibility is to require consumers to authenti-
cate themselves when complaining about poisoned content.
This would entail signing the interest (or another new packet
type) that complains about allegedly bad content. One un-
pleasant privacy consequence is that the signer (consumer)
would be exposed by the signature, since it would need to
be bound to a public key, contained in a certificate. (This
certificate would have to be communicated with each com-
plaint message, along with auxiliary information that the
router would need to trust the certificate.) More generally,
signing would violate one of the key elements of NDN ar-
chitecture – consumer opacity. Recall that producers sign
content, while consumers do not sign interests, or any other
messages.
Another reason why consumer signing of “complaint” mes-
sages is problematic is because it can be abused to mount
DoS attacks on routers by flooding them with junk com-
plaints and forcing expensive signature verification.5 Note
that, even if the router successfully authenticates a con-
sumer complaint, this is no guarantee that the accused con-
tent is fake; in order to be sure, the router would have to
verify the content signature as well. Moreover, authentica-
tion of consumers by routers would require identity manage-
ment and verification systems to be in place at the network
layer, thus adding significant overhead.
Finally, the preceding discussion applies not only to con-
tent cached by routers. Since NDN only recommends, and
does not mandate, content caching, it is entirely legal for a
router not to cache some, or all, content that it forwards. If
a router does not cache C, then complaining about C being
fake is clearly useless.
At this point, it becomes clear that dealing with fake con-
tent represents a real challenge for NDN. Although some
light-weight non-cryptographic and partially effective counter-
measures have been proposed (e.g., [16]), they do not fully
address the problem and quickly become ineffective against
an active adversary.
3.1 Zooming In
Based on the above arguments and recent results simulat-
ing content-poisoning attacks [16], we conclude that NDN
has a major security problem, since it offers: (1) no way
to prevent fake content from being delivered to consumers,
and (2) no way to reliably flush invalid content from router
caches. There are two reasons for this problem:
5The same attack does not work with flooding of routers
with junk content since content can not be sent unsolicited
and a router would only attempt signature verification of
incoming content for which it has a pending interest entry
in its PIT.
1. Ambiguous interests: NDN requires each interest to
carry the name of desired content. However, neither the
digest component of the name, nor the PPKD is a required
field in an interest. In other words, an interest for a content
name can be satisfied by multiple content objects, including
those with untrusted or unverifiable signatures.
2. No unified trust model: even if routers could verify
signatures at line speed, NDN does not provide a trust model
enforceable at the network layer. Although two aforemen-
tioned selector fields can be used to communicate content-
specific trust context to the network layer, NDN has no
mechanism for a consumer to securely pre-acquire the hash
of a given content, or the specific public key that should be
used to verify a content signature.
In order to demonstrate the grave effect content poison-
ing can have on NDN, we conducted a simple experiment
using ndnSIM [3] – a simplified implementation of NDN ar-
chitecture as a NS-3 [29] module. Our results verified that
content poisoning can significantly delay or block customers
from accessing valid content. Details about the experiment
setup and results can be found in Appendix A.
3.2 Goals
As a first step in addressing the content poisoning prob-
lem, it is necessary to acknowledge the obvious, i.e., that
network-layer trust management and content poi-
soning are inseparably conjoined. Since content is the
basic unit of network-layer “currency” in NDN, trust in con-
tent (and not in its producers or consumers) is the central
issue at the network layer.
Second, trust-related complexity (activities, state mainte-
nance, etc.) must be minimized at the network layer. Specif-
ically, as part of validating content, a router should not:
fetch public key certificates, perform expiration and
revocation checking of certificates, maintain its own
collection of certificates, or be aware of trust seman-
tics of various applications.6
On a related note, we claim that, ideally, a router should
verify at most one signature per content. This upper-
bounds the heavier part of content-related cryptographic
overhead; the other part is computing a content hash. Ide-
ally, a router would not perform any signature verification
at all. However, as discussed below, this might be possible
for some, yet not all, content. Also, although verifying a
signature given an appropriate public key is a mechanical
operation, a router would still need to support multiple sig-
nature algorithms since uniformity across all applications is
improbable.
The above discussion implies that NDN entities other than
routers, i.e., producers and consumers of content, should
bear the brunt of trust management.
4. THE INTEREST-KEY BINDING RULE
Ghodsi et al. [17] informally argue that, for each content,
at least two out of three possible bindings (producer-key,
name-key, producer-name) must be present. The third bind-
ing is transitively inherited from the other two. Due to the
use of human-readable names in NDN, producer–name bind-
ing can be easily inferred.7 Our approach to network-layer
6This is separate from trust management for routing proto-
cols.
7If we assume that names are clear and unambiguous.
trust adheres to all goals outlined above. It is based on the
binding between a name and the public key used to ver-
ify the content signature. We denote it as the Interest-Key
Binding (IKB) rule:
IKB: An interest must reflect the public key of the producer.
A very similar concept – self-certifying naming scheme –
is described in [18]. As discussed in Section 5, this concept
needs to be adjusted for the NDN context. Recall that NDN
interest format (Section 2) includes an optional field PPKD
which serves exactly this purpose. Our approach makes it
mandatory without any substantive changes to the NDN
architecture.
An NDN public key is a special type of content in the
form of a certificate signed by the issuing CA. Each certifi-
cate contains a list of all name prefixes that it is authorized
to sign/verify. The name of the certificate-issuing (content-
signing) CA and the name of the key contained in a certifi-
cate (content) are not required to have any specific relation-
ship. This is part and parcel of NDN’s philosophy of leaving
trust management up to the application, e.g., signed content
C can be verified with public key PK with C and PK hav-
ing no common prefix. For instance, content containing the
public key /cnn/usa/web/key could be issued and verified
by the key /verisign/key. Of course, an application is free
to impose all kinds of restrictions, as long as routers remain
oblivious.
4.1 Implications for Producers and Routers
We now examine IKB implications on content producers
and routers, respectively.
For content producers, IKB has very few consequences.
In fact, it simplifies content construction by asking the pro-
ducer to include the public key itself in the KeyLocator field
of content. In other words, IKB obviates two other current
NDN options: (1) referring to a verification key (via the
KeyLocator field) by its name, or (2) including it in a form
of a certificate.
For NDN routers, IKB implications are overwhelmingly
positive. First, a router needs to perform no fetching, stor-
ing or parsing of public key certificates, as well as no revo-
cation or expiration checking. All such activities are left to
consumers.
Upon receiving a content and identifying the PIT entry
(corresponding to one or more pending interests) a router
simply hashes the public key from the content KeyLocator
field and checks whether it matches the PPKD of the PIT
entry. In case of a mismatch, the content is discarded.8
Otherwise, the content signature is verified and (if valid)
the content is forwarded and cached.
The implications would be even more beneficial for pro-
ducers and routers with the use of self-certifying content
names (SCNs), as discussed in Section 5 below. With this
optimization, inclusion of key information and signature check-
ing could be avoided for most content objects, thus further
reducing the communication and computation overhead.
4.2 Implications for Consumers
For consumers, IKB does not increase complexity. It ac-
8A slightly simpler alternative is to perform PIT lookup each
incoming content by using both content name and public key
hash.
tually prompts us to codify desired consumer behavior –
something that has been left unspecified in the NDN archi-
tecture.
The most immediate IKB consequence for a consumer is
the need to obtain and validate the producer’s public
key before issuing an interest for any content origi-
nated by that producer. At the first glance, this might
appear to be an example of the proverbial “chicken-and-egg”
problem. However, we show below that this is not the case.
A consumer that wants to fetch certain content C is do-
ing so as part of some NDN application, APPC . We assume
that a consumer must have already installed this applica-
tion. APPC must have a well-defined trust management
architecture that is handled by its consumer-side software.
However, the remaining question is: how to bootstrap trust
and how to obtain initial public keys?
We consider three non-exclusive alternatives:
(1) One possibility is that APPC client-side software comes
with some pre-installed root public key(s), perhaps con-
tained within self-signed certificates. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that there is only one such key – PKroot.
Armed with it, a consumer can request lower-level certifi-
cates, by issuing an interest referencing the hash of PKroot
in the PPKD field.9
(2) Alternatively, one could imagine a global Key Name Ser-
vice (KNS), somewhat akin to today’s Domain Name Ser-
vice (DNS). In response to consumer-issued interests refer-
encing public key names and/or name prefixes, KNS would
reply with signed content containing one or more public key
certificates (i.e., as embedded content) corresponding to re-
quested names.
(3) A similar approach is a global search-based service, i.e.,
something resembling today’s Google. A consumer would
issue a search query (via an interest) to the search engine
which would reply with signed content representing a set
(e.g., one page at a time) of query results. One or more of
those results would point to content corresponding to the
public key certificate of interest to the consumer.
In cases (2) and (3), consumers would still need to some-
how securely obtain the root public keys for KNS and the
search engine, respectively. This can be easily done via (1).
4.3 Security Arguments
We now return to the original motivation for this work –
mitigation of content poisoning attacks. We need to show
that global adherence to the IKB rule leads to security against
content poisoning.10
If we assume that:
1. Every router abides by the IKB rule and acts as de-
scribed in Section 4.1.
2. Every consumer abides by the IKB rule and acts as
described in Section 4.2.
3. The consumer requesting content C is not malicious.
4. Each router R that is one hop away from the consumer
is not compromised.
5. The links between a consumer and its adjacent routers
are not compromised.
We can briefly argue security by contradiction: Suppose that
9If APPC comes with several root public keys, the consumer
would need to issue multiple simultaneous interests referenc-
ing the hash of each root key in PPKD.
10Note that, as mentioned in Section 1, cache pollution at-
tacks are an entirely different matter.
a consumer receives fake content C from R. Let Int denote
the interest (issued earlier by that consumer) that was sat-
isfied by C. According to IKB, Int must contain the digest
of a public key of producer P in its PPKD field. Let PK de-
note this public key. Consequently, R must have made sure
that: (1) C is signed with a public key PK′ with a hash
matching PPKD of Int , meaning that H(PK′) = H(PK)
and (2) the signature itself is correct, i.e., valid. Also, since
R is not malicious and all communication between R and
(also not malicious) the consumer is secure, the only re-
maining possibility is a hash collision, i.e., PK′ 6= PK
while H(PK′) = H(PK). The latter is assumed to occur
with negligible probability.
This does not yet conclude our security discussion. As
noted in [15], content poisoning attacks can originate with
malicious routers. What happens if a malicious router R′
feeds poisoned content C′ to its non-malicious next hop
neighbor R, towards some consumer(s)? Since R is hon-
est and implements IKB, before forwarding and (optionally)
caching C′, it verifies, as before, that the signature of C′ is
successfully verifiable using PK that matches the hash in
the corresponding PIT entry, i.e., the value of the PPKD field
of the original interest Int that triggered creation of this
PIT entry.
A more detailed security argument is provided in Ap-
pendix B.
5. OPTIMIZATIONS
As mentioned before, IKB rule implies that routers should
perform only one signature verification using the public key
provided (by the producer) in the content and specified (by
the consumer) using the PPKD field in the interest. Instead
of including the public key in the content, it could be di-
rectly included by the consumer in the interest. This would
require storing the public key alongside the interest in the
PIT entry, to be used later for signature verification of the
content. Since it is fair to assume that cache entries have
longer lifetime than PIT entries, this approach can be ben-
eficial in terms of storage. Its main drawback, however, is
that the current interest format would need to be modified
to include public keys.
For backbone routers that process and forward tens of
gigabits per second, performing even a single signature veri-
fication per packet imposes a huge overhead. One approach
to overcome this problem is to take advantage of the network
structure. The current Internet is divided into Autonomous
Systems (AS-s), each representing an administrative entity.
In this architecture, only border routers of consumer-facing
AS-s might implement the IKB rule by verifying signatures
of all received contents. Alternatively, each router in an
AS might probabilistically verify signatures on a subset of
packets it forwards. The drawback of these approaches are
that fake content could still be cached by routers that did
not verify its signature. However, either method would have
good chance of detecting and discarding most fake content
before reaching to the consumer.
Another way to reduce signature verification overhead is
to use SCNs [18, 14, 26, 15, 4]. According to [33], a content
name can only have at most two out of the following three
properties: security, uniqueness and human-readability. As
suggested in [17, 18], SCNs can be formed by appending
to the producer’s public key digest a label that uniquely
identifies the content. While this approach guarantees se-
curity and uniqueness, it lacks the means of verifying the
binding between the content and its name [32]. To over-
come this issue in NDN, we consider forming an SCN by
specifying the hash of requested content as the last compo-
nent of the content name in the interest [20]. This provides
name-content as well as producer-name, producer-key and
name-key security bindings (as in Section 4). Although this
use of SCNs does not yield fully human-readable names, it
provides uniqueness and security properties [17].
If a benign NDN consumer uses SCNs, the network guar-
antees (due to longest-prefix matching) delivery of “valid”
content. The main advantage is that routers no longer need
to verify signatures. Instead, they only recompute a content
hash and check that it matches the one in the corresponding
PIT entry. The remaining question is: how can a consumer
obtain the hash of a content beforehand?
For the type of communication where most content is re-
quested using SCNs, we advocate the use of so-called cata-
logs. A catalog is basically an authenticated data structure
that includes a set of SCNs. This set can consists of ref-
erences to content objects containing data, public keys, or
other catalogs. The structure of catalogs can be application-
specific and might vary from a simple list of SCNs, to multi-
ple SCN sets forming a Merkle tree [27] or some similar data
structure. To securely fetch an initial catalog, a consumer
can fall back to using the PPKD interest field, as discussed
earlier.
One obvious corollary of using SCNs in interest messages
is that consumers and routers are no longer required to ver-
ify content signatures, as long as the SCN is trusted, i.e.,
obtained from a (consumer-verified) catalog. This reduces:
(1) overhead of publishing, since producers now sign cata-
logs rather than individual content, and (2) network over-
head, since there is no need to add the public key to the
KeyLocator field of the content, as discussed in Section 4.
The only time a signature is required is whenever a con-
tent is requested via PPKD interest field. In that case, both
routers (prior to serving content from cache or forwarding
it) and consumers (prior to accepting) must perform content
signature verification. We believe that is should be left up
to the producer to decide whether a content should be re-
quested by specifying its corresponding public key, SCN, or
both.
Using SCNs in conjunction with catalogs brings up the is-
sue of unsigned content objects. In other words, a content C
which is indirectly signed as part of a catalog, can be fetched
by its SCN, i.e., name-hash combination. This does not rule
out C being separately signed by its producer. However,
signing a catalog-ed content increases overhead for the pro-
ducer and increases content size. A sensible approach is not
to sign catalog-ed content objects at all. This would imply
that such objects can only be fetched via SCN. However,
NDN architecture requires each content to be individually
verifiable. Thus, existence of unsigned objects conflicts with
a basic tenet of NDN 11.
6. PROPOSED MODEL IN PRACTICE
NDN was designed as a candidate next-generation Inter-
net architecture. In order to provide a smooth and successful
11This is not the case for the latest version of CCNx, the
original architecture that spawned NDN. CCNx 1.0 adopts
secure catalogs (called manifests) and its packet format sup-
ports unsigned content objects[6].
transition path, NDN must contend with application-specific
requirements, such as trust. In this section we discuss how
the aforementioned trust model and its optimization could
be applied in practice. We start by identifying different traf-
fic types.
6.1 Content Distribution
This type of traffic corresponds to client-server communi-
cation in and accounts for well over 90% of current Internet
traffic[19]. Since most requested content is static, creating
secure catalogs is straightforward. Consumers request cata-
logs and then use included SCNs to request desired content.
We consider two common examples of content distribution
traffic:
Audio/Video Streaming: A typical audio/video is a large
content split into several segments with different names (as
mentioned in Section 2). If a catalog containing the SCNs of
all the segments can be provided, consumers can use these
names in subsequent interests to retrieve all segments of the
content.
Internet Browsing: We anticipate that most HTML files would
fit into a single content object [31, 1]. A typical HTML file
contains reference links to other static and dynamic content,
such as images, audio or other HTML pages (sub-pages).
While rendering HTML files, Internet browsers parse all ref-
erence links and download corresponding content. There-
fore, if an HTML file uses SCNs as references, it can be
viewed and treated as a secure catalog. Of course, SCNs can
only be used for static content, since the hash of dynamic
(e.g., generated upon request) content cannot be known a
priori.
Internet browsing provides a good example of content that
can be requested via either PPKD or SCNs. Suppose that a
web page A contains a reference link to sub-page B and this
link is expressed using an SCN. Once a consumer requests
and obtains page A, the client browser can request B using
the appropriate SCN in A. Whereas, other consumers might
wish to directly request page B (not as part of A) using its
PPKD. Note that, for obvious reasons, SCNs can not be
used with HTML pages (or any other content) with circular
references, e.g., A ↔ B.
6.2 Interactive Traffic
Another major traffic type corresponds to interactive com-
munication, where content is generated on demand. Appli-
cations such as voice/video conferencing, remote terminal
access and on-line gaming fall into this category. Such appli-
cations generally benefit from network caching only in cases
of packet loss, since re-issued interests for lost packets are
likely to be satisfied by the first hop NDN router. Obviously,
the use of large catalogs for interactive real-time traffic is
neither sensible nor feasible. Instead, consumers should re-
quest content by using PPKD in interests, in conjunction with
producers perhaps offering small dynamically-generated cat-
alogs, if short delays can be tolerated.
7. RELATED WORK
Some prior research efforts discussed naming in content-
oriented networks and its relationship to security. Notably,
[17] proposes establishing bindings between three ICN en-
tities : (1) real-world identity coupled with the the pro-
ducer of each content object, (2) name, and (3) public key
used to verify the object signature. Only two of the three
possible bindings (real-world identity–name, name–key and
real-world identify–key) are required, while the third can be
transitively inherited. However, it is unclear how these bind-
ings can be practically applied in the specific NDN settings.
Self-certifying naming schemes are discussed in [17, 18,
13, 23]. Names are of the form P : L where P is the di-
gest (hash) of the producer’s public key, and L is a label
set by the producer. It is the latter’s responsibility to make
sure that names of this form are unique. This guarantees
the name–key binding and trades off human readability of
names for strong security properties. Although, NDN use
human-readable names, name-key binding is achievable by
adding the PPKD field to interest messages. This allows inter-
est forwarding based on longest-prefix matching on names.
Whereas, using the P : L scheme in NDN would result in
tremendously large routing tables. We again recall that self-
certifying names in NDN [20] are composed by adding the
hash of the content as a name suffix (last component).
Prior work on Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on NDN in-
cludes [8] and [2]. Both results addressed a specific DoS at-
tack type – Interest Flooding – based on inundating routers
with spurious interest messages. Content poisoning was
identified in [15], which also sketched out some tentative
countermeasures. Subsequently, [16] proposed the first con-
crete (however, only probabilistic) countermeasure based on
analyzing exclusion patterns for cached content.
Trust and trust management systems are well studied in
the literature, especially, in distributed environments, such
as MANETs, ad hoc and wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
[7] surveys the state of the art in trust management systems
for MANETs. It emphasizes the need to combine the no-
tions of “social trust” with “quality-of-service (QoS) trust”.
A similar survey can be found in [30]. [25] presents an exten-
sive review of trust management systems in WSNs. Based
on unique features of WSNs, trust management system’s
best practices are derived and state of the art countermea-
sures are evaluated against them. [35] discusses security
challenges in designing WSNs. It distinguishes between the
definitions of trust and security, and shows that cryptogra-
phy is not always the solution for trust management. In-
stead, techniques from other domains should be included in
defining and formalizing trust.
Since a single trust metric might not suffice to express
trustworthiness of nodes, a multi-dimensional trust manage-
ment framework is suggested in [24]. Three metrics are used:
(1) node collaboration to perform tasks, such as packet for-
warding, (2) node behavior, e.g., flagging nodes that flood
the network, and (3) correctness of node-disseminated infor-
mation, e.g., routing updates.
[9] proposes a framework for calculating a network entity’s
reputation score based on previous interactions feedback. In
this framework, each service can apply its own reputation
scoring functions. It also supports caching of trust evalua-
tion to reduce network overhead, and provides an API for
reporting feedback and calculating reputation scores.
Policymaker [5] is a tool that provides privacy and authen-
ticity for network services. It offers a flexible and unified
language for expressing policies and relationships. It also
includes a local (per site or network) engine for carrying all
trust operations, such as granting access to services.
All aforementioned techniques involve keeping track of
other nodes’ behavior in order to decide whether they are
trusted. However, this general strategy is a poor match for
NDN, since routers need an efficient mechanism to trust con-
tent, and not other entities. Because content can be served
from anywhere it is impractical for routers to trust other
entities.
8. CONCLUSION
As argued in this paper, the NDN architecture is inher-
ently susceptible to content poisoning attacks. To mitigate
these attacks, we postulated some intuitive trust manage-
ment goals needed to support content validation in NDN
routers. We then presented simple rules that allow all NDN
entities to validate content. These rules are compatible with
the tenets of the NDN architecture. We also suggested sev-
eral optimization techniques.
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APPENDIX A
We first describe the adversary model and how fake content
can be injected. We consider a proactive content poison-
ing attack whereby Adv anticipates interests for content C
with name n and injects fake content with the same name
into router caches. Fake content can be injected into the
network via malicious routers or end-nodes. For example,
consider an Adv (consisting of malicious consumer Crm and
a malicious producer Pm) targeting a specific victim router
Rv. Assuming that Crm and Pm are connected to different
interfaces of Rv, Crm sends an interest for n. Once this
interest is received by Rv and an entry is added to the PIT,
Pm sends a fake content to Rv which is promptly cached.
Consequently, Rv is pre-polluted with fake content, ready
for arrival of genuine interests. To maximize longevity of
the attack, Pm sets the freshness field of fake content to a
maximum value.
We simulate the DFN topology, Deutsches ForschungsNetz
(German Research Network) [12, 11] – a network developed
for research and education purposes. It consists of several
connected routers positioned in different areas of the coun-
try, as shown in Figure 1(a). Our experiment measures how
many benign consumers can retrieve a satisfactory (genuine)
content and how fast they can do so when the router caches
are poisoned. The simulation starts with core router caches
pre-populated with various fake versions of the target con-
tent, 80% (1 valid and 4 fake content objects), 90% (1 valid
9 fake objects), 99% (1 valid 99 fake objects), and 99.9% (1
valid 999 fake objects). To show the effect of having multiple
consumers connected to the same router, we configure edge
router to run without cache. Figure 1(b) shows the results
of this experiment. We can notice that it takes more than 20
seconds for 90% of the consumers to retrieve valid content
Consumer
Edge Router
Core Router
(a) DFN topology - each edge router above is con-
nected to 5 NDN consumers
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Figure 1: Content Poisoning Attack
in the case pre-populated fake content objects rate of 99%.
Moreover, more than 60% of the consumers do not receive
valid content during the time of the simulation, when the
pre-population rate is 99.9%.
APPENDIX B
Definition 9.1. A hash function H is second pre-image
resistant, if for any given x, no probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) adversary A can find a value x′ 6= x such that H(x) =
H(x′). In other words, Pr [H(x) = H(x′)] ≤ (n), where
(n) is negligible and n is the security parameter. A formal
definition of probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries and
negligible functions can be found in [22]
Definition 9.2. A signature scheme Π is unforgeable if
for any message m, no PPT adversary A (given a public
key PK) can generate a valid signature without knowing the
corresponding private key. We denote the success of A as
Aforge(m) = 1, i.e., if Π is unforgeable, there exists a negli-
gible function (n) such that: Pr
[Aforge(m) = 1] ≤ (n).
Definition 9.3. For any interest message Int with H(PK)
(the digest of the verifying public key for the corresponding
content) assigned to the PPKD field, and for any A, the NDN
cache poisoning experiment is defined as follows:
Given Int as input to A, it outputs a content object C′
containing: (1) a public key PK′ in the KeyLocator field,
(2) a digest of this key H(PK′) in PPKD, and (3) a signature
σ′ in the Signature field. The output of this experiment is
defined to be 1 if one of the following holds:
• PK 6= PK′ and H(PK) = H(PK′),
• or, PK = PK′ and σ is valid.
In other words, A can either violate the second pre-image
resistance of H (we denote this event as collision which
occurs with some probability pc and succeeds with probability
Pr [H(x) = H(x′)]), or forge the signature (we denote this
event as forge which occurs with some probability pf and
succeeds with Pr
[Aforge(m) = 1]). We denote the success
of A as Apois(Int) = 1.
Theorem 9.4. Given H, Π (as defined above), A suc-
ceeds in injecting a fake content object C′ into a network
that abides by the IKB rule with a negligible probability (n).
Pr
[
Apois (Int) = 1
]
≤ (n)
Proof. We show the above by contradiction:
Assume that A succeeds in injecting C′ with a non-neg-
ligible probability. Then, we can construct a reduction A′
(another PPT adversary), that uses A to break second pre-
image resistance of H, or unforgeability of Π:
Adversary A′
1. Is given a hash value x.
2. Creates an interest message Int and sets H(x) as its
PPKD field value.
3. Runs A(Int) to obtain C′.
4. Extracts from C′ and outputs:
(a) PK′ as a collision with x, if x 6= PK′,
(b) or σ′ as a forged signature for C′, if x = PK′.
We now determine the probability of success of A′. When-
ever either collision or forge event occurs A′ succeeds.
Therefore,
Pr
[A′ succeeds] = Pr [collision ∪ forge]
= pc · Pr
[H(x) = H(PK′)]
+ pf · Pr
[
A′forge(C′) = 1
]
> (n)
The last inequality holds because A′ succeeds with the same
probability as A, which is non-negligible. If the result of
adding two functions is non-negligible, at least one of them
must be non-negligible [22]. Moreover, since both pc and pf
cannot be exponential functions, then either
Pr [H(x) = H(PK′)] > (n) or Pr
[
A′forge(C′) = 1
]
> (n).
